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RECENT CASES
CARRIERS - ELEVATORS- CARE REQUIRED - "COMMON CARRIER" - PER-
RAULT V. EMPoRIUm DEPARTMENT STORE CO., 128 PAC. (WASH.), 1049.-
Held, that an elevator used to carry passengers is a common carrier, and
one operating it, like other common carriers, must exercise the highest de-
gree of care compatible with its practical operation.
It is a well established rule that from a common carrier of passengers
the highest degree of care is required. Derwort v. Loomer, 21 Conn., 253.
The important question, therefore, decided in the principal case, is whether
a passenger elevator is a common carrier. The majority of the States
which have decided this question, hold that a person operating an elevator
in a store or office building is a common carrier of passengers. Morgan v.
Saks, 38 So. (Ala.), 848; Beidler z. Branshaw, 200 Ill., 425; Hensler v.
Stix, 113 Mo. App., 162; Fox v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa., 127. On the other
hand recent decisions in New York, Rhode Island, and Michigan hold that
a passenger elevator is not a common carrier, and the owner is only bound
to use reasonable care in operating it. Griffln v. Manice, 166 N. Y., 197;
Burgess v. Stowe, 134 Mich., 204; Edwards v. Manufacturers' Bldg. Co.,
27 R. I., 248. This decision of the minority of the States, as opposed to
the holding in the principal case, and to the holding of the majority of the
States, is more consistent with the accepted definition of a common car-
rier, namely, that a common carrier is one who holds himself ready to
carry for all persons indifferently, who choose to hire him. U. S. Express
Co. v. Backman, 28 Ohio St., 150. A person operating an elevator in his
store or office building does not carry passengers for hire; nor does he
hold himself out to carry for all; he carries only for his tenants or for
those who enter upon his implied invitation for the purpose of transacting
business with him.
CONDITIONS-RESTRAINT OF MARRIAGE-PUBLIC POLICY.-RUGGLES V.
JEwEIT, 99 N. E. (MASS.), 1092.-Held, that a will giving the home place to
two daughters as long as they remain single, the main purpose not being to
promote celibacy, is not against public policy as being in restraint of mar-
riage.
A condition in a devise which effects a general restraint of marriage
is void. Smythe v. Sinythe, 96 Va., 638. If the effect is only partially to
restrain marriage, it is generally valid. Collier v. Slaughter, 20 Ala., 263;
Reuff v. Coleman, 30 W. Va., 171; Hogan v. Curtin, 88 N. Y., 163. A con-
dition annexed to a devise to a widow that defeats her estate and gives the
land to another, in case she marries again, is, in most jurisdictions, valid.
Cornell v. Lovett's Ex., 35 Pa. St., 100; Martin v. Seigler, 32 S. C., 267;
Herd v. Catron, 97 Tenn., 505. It was held, however, in Indiana, that such a
provision in a devise to a widow was in restraint of marriage and void.
RECENT CASES
Stilwell v. Knapper, 69 Ind., 558. And this veiw is also held in the earlier
Massachusetts decisions. Parsons v. Winslow, 6 Mass., 169. Later de-
cisions, however, construe such a provision as a conditional limitation and
not as a condition subsequent, and valid. Knight v. Mahoney, 152 Mass.,
523. The way the Courts insist on the distinction between a conditional
limitation, as where the grant is to a daughter until she marries, and a con-
dition subsequent, as where the grant is to a daughter, if she remain sin-
gle, generally upholding the former but declaring the latter void, is well
illustrated in Coppage v. Alexander's Heirs, 41 Ky. (2 B. Mon.), 313.
Upon facts like those in the principal case the provision was held to be in
restraint of marriage and void. Kennedy v. Alexander, 21 App. D. C., 424.
In other jurisdictions the opposite conclusion was reached. Mann v. Jack-
son, 84 Me., 400; In re Holbrook's Estate, 213 Pa., 93; Trenton Trust &
Safe Deposit Co. v. Armstrong, 70 N. J. Eq., 272. The holding in the
principal case is in harmony with the weight of authority. But it would
seem that in giving effect to such provisions, it should be considered
whether the condition or limitation will, in fact, operate to restrain mar-
riage, as public policy is equally violated by a condition or limitation the
natural effect of which is to promote celibacy.
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE OF OTHER OFFENSEs-ADISSIBILITY.-
STATE v. DAVIDSON, 148 S. V. (Mo.), 79.-Held, on trial for obtaining
money by false pretenses based on accused's representations, inducing the
purchaise of corporate stock by prosecutor and the delivery of a note to the
accused for the price, evidence that the accused made similar representa-
tions in selling and attempting to sell stock in the same corporation to a
third person after the sale to the prosecutor, was admissible to show crim-
inal intent to defraud.
Where the quo animo constitutes a necessary part of the crime charged
and proof of the intention is indispensable to establish the guilt of the
party, evidence of similar acts or conduct toward the same or different
persons at or about the same time and place, is, by weight of authority,
admissible as showing the necessary intent. State v. Gibson, 132 Iowa, 53;
Houst v. People, 24 Col., 26Z Evidence of previous acts of the same kind
whether done to the same or a different person is, by the weight of au-
thority, admissible to show the specific intent. People v. Seaman, 107
Mich., 348; People v. Everhardt, 104 N. Y., 591. As to the length of time
allowed between the alleged act and the previous act, Courts have not laid
down any rule. Evidence of subsequent acts has also been held admissible
as showing the intent of the accused. For instance, on an indictment for
having counterfeit bank bills with intent to pass them, evidence that eight
days afterward accused had in his possession other and different bank bills
was held admissible to show the necessary intent. Comm. v. Price, 76
Mass., 472. Also on a charge of using an instrument on the body of a
woman with intent to procure a miscarriage, evidence that the accused ad-
ministered the same treatment ten days later was held admissible as show-
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ing the specific intent. Comm. v. Corkin, 136 Mass., 429. No rule defining
the length of time between the alleged and the subsequent act, proof of
which is offered in evidence, has been laid down by the Courts. While the
rule of the principal case has been followed in only a small number of
jurisdictions, there seems to be a tendency to follow this rule in a large
number of other States. Reg. v. Richardson, 2 F. & F., 343; Johnson v.
State, 75 Ark., 427. In furtherance of justice and on the ground of public
policy this is, without doubt, a wise rule to adopt, but care should be exer-
cised to limit it to this particular class of cases.
ELECTRICITY - LIABILITY OF TELEPHONE COMPANY- NEGLIGENCE. 
-
PENINSULAR TELEPHONE Co. v. McCASKILL, 60 So. (FLA.), 338.-Held, that
a telephone company may be liable in damages for a fire caused by its wires
transmitting electricity from lightning, it being shown that none of the
usual safeguards were used.
That lightning is frequently discharged from the clouds to earth and
is likely to pass along metal wires is a matter of common knowledge.
Starr v. Southern Bell T. & T. Co., 156 N. C., 435. Hence it is the duty
of a telephone company to select and maintain such approved devices for
arresting and diverting atmospheric electricity as is reasonably necessary
to guard against accident from such a current carried over its wires.
Griflith v. New England T. & T. Co., 72 Vt., 441. While the telephone
companies, inviting the public to use their instruments are not insurers,
Brucker v. Gainesboro Tel. Co., 125 Ky., 92, and are not obliged to guar-
antee the safety of their system under all possible conditions, Wells v.
North Eastern Tel. Co., 101 Me., 371, they must exercise a high degree of
care to protect their patrons from a dangerous electric current over their
wires from any source. Delahunt et al. v. United T. & T. Co., 215 Pa., 241.
Although lightning is an act of God, its transmission into a house over the
disconnected wires is considered as the act of the company, Evans v.
Eastern Ky. T. & T. Co., 124 Ky., 620; and it is no defense in an action
for damages that the tortious act of a third party, or an inevitable accident
or inanimate thing, contributed to cause the injury if the negligence of the
company was the efficient cause. Byron Tel. Co. v. Sheets, 122 Ill. App, 6.
Nor is it a defense that the wires were left in the building with the consent
of the owner. Southern Bell T. & T. Co. v. McTyer, 137 Ala., 601. But
where no negligence can be shown on part of the company the rule "res
ipsa loquitur" will not be applied even if the person is injured by a shock
during an electric storm. Rocap v. Bell Tel. Co. of Phila., 230 Pa., 597
The only case seeming to take the contrary view is that of Phoenix Light
& Fuel Co. v. Bennett, 8 Ariz., 314, which holds that it is not within the
duty of an electric company to provide insulation sufficient to ward off
lightning from its wires, for the law justly ascribes such consequences to
inevitable misfortune or to "act of God" and leaves the result to be borne
by him upon whom it falls.
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HUSBAND AND WIFE--ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS-JUSTIFICATION.-
MILLER v. PEARCE, 85 ATL. REP., 620.-Held, an action by a wife for the-
alienation of the affections of her husband, is not defeated by the fact that
the wife was entirely estranged from her husband before his acquaintance
with defendant, but that fact was admissible only in mitigation of damages.
At common law the wife was not allowed to sue for the alienation of
her husband's affections, Van Arnam v. Ayres, 67 Barb., 544; Duffles v.
Dufiles, 76 Wis., 374; contra, Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y., 584; though
some cases held she had the right to sue but the right was in abeyance be-
cause of coverture. Smith v. Smith, 98 Tenn., 101. Under present State
statutes, however, one sex is not accorded relief denied reciprocally to
another. Schouler, Husband and Wife, Chap. 3, page 532; Sims v. Sims,
76 AUt., 1063; Keen v. Keen, 49 Ore., 362. The only States now holding
the contrary are Maine and Wisconsin. Morgan v. Martin, 92 Me., 190;
DufItes v. Dufiles, 76 Wis., 374. This right to sue accrues even if the mar-
riage has not been physically consummated, Cochran v. Cochran, 111 N.'Y-
S., 588; and in an alienation suit the husband's conjugal. affection is pre-
sumed. Gregg v. Gregg, 37 Ind. App., 210. Even lack of affection, though,
is no bar to the action, Morris v. Warwick, 42 Wash., 480; nor need the
defendant's acts be the sole cause of the alienation of affections. Rath v.
Rath, 2 Neb., 600. Furthermore, the plaintiff need not show that the
alienation of affections was committed before the husband's desertion of
his wife. Humphrey v. Pope, 122 Cal., 253. The wife's right, then, to sue
for the alienation of her husband's affections, just as he always might sue
for the alienation of hers, seems thoroughly established. Of the three
States that held the contrary, Maine and Wisconsin have not passed on the
point recently, and New Jersey, in Sims v. Sims, cited supra, in July, 1910,
overruled its decision in Hodge v. Wetzler, 69 N. 3. L., and is now in ac-
cord with the majority opinion.
LIBEL-CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY-PLACE OF PUBLICATION.-PEOPLE V_
BiELER, 139 N. Y. S., 819.-A libelous letter is published both in the
place wheie it is posted in the mail and in the place to which it is ad-.
dressed, the postmark being prima facie evidence that the letter was in the
postoflfice on the date of the postmark; so that the publication of a libelous
letter addressed to one in Switzerland was complete when deposited in
the postoffice in New York city with postage prepaid for its transmission
to Switzerland.
In libel there must be a publication, Prescott v. Tousey, 50 N. Y. S.,
12, but the term "publication" is ambiguous. Townshend, (Libel and Slan-
der), page 83. It has been held not to have the same meaning in criminal
and civil prosecutions. Watrous v. Chalker, 7 Conn., 266, held it was crim-
inal libel to send the libel to the one defamed; contra, Lyle v. Clason, 1
Caines, 581; Wilcox v. Moon, 64 Vt., 450; McCarlie v. Atkinson, 77 Miss.,
594; State v. Syphrett, 2 S. E. Rep., 624, holding tere must be, in crim-
inal libel, as in civil libel, publication to a third person. Clark, Criminal
Law, page 241, sustains the Connecticut doctrine on the ground that the
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gist of criminal libel is the tendency to breach of peace. Mere writing
is not publication, Weir v. Hoss, 6 Ala., 881; printing a book is not publi-
cation, Jewelers' Agency v. Publishing Co., 32 N. Y. S., 41; nor is posting
a writing and taking it down before it is read, publication. 1 Stark. Rep.,
471. However, it has been held that mailing a letter is publication. Smith
v. State, 32 Tex., 594; Mankins v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. Rep., 662; Watrous v.
Chalker, supra. The leading case, Rex v. Burdett, 3 B. & A., 717, held
that mailing was a publication because there was no locus poenitentiae.
On the other hand, it has been held that there was no publication till the
letter was received and read, McCarlie v. Atkinson, supra; Fonville v.
McNease, 1 Dudd. (S. C.), 303, semble; and that there is no publication
until there is a communication to a person who understands it. Prescott
v. Tousey, supra. Chapter 245 of the Penal Code of New York, 1903,
based on Rex v. Bitrdette, supra, reads, "to sustain charge of publishing
libel * * * it is enough that defendant part with immediate custody". The
principal case is in accord with the statute and with the weight of au-
thority at common law, which favors the doctrine that mailing is publica-
tion. Academically at least, this seems a doubtful doctrine, as frequently
a letter may be withdrawn after mailing; or through accident, negligence,
or design may never reach its destination.
MASTER AND SERANT-UNLAWFUL EmPLOYMENT OF CHILD-MISSTATE-
MENT AS To AGE OF CHILD.-DESoTo COAL, MINING & DEVELOPMENT Co. V.
HILL, 60 So. (ALA.), 583.-Held, that where a mining company employs a
boy under fourteen years of age in its mine in violation of Code 1907, Sec.
1035, it is liable for injuries resulting to him from the employment, and
incident to any risks of the master's business, though not the proximate
result of any act or omission of the boy in the discharge of the duty as-
signed to him, and though he or his parent may have misstated his age and
led the master to believe him to be over the prohibited age; the mining
company being in effect an insurer of the boy's age when it employs him.
The doctrine is well established that the violation of a statute for-
bidding the employment in a factory of a child under a certain age is neg-
ligence per se. Starnes v. Albion Mfg. Co., 147 N. C., 556; Brower v.
Locke, 31 Ind. App., 353; Cooke v. Lalance Grosjean Mfg. Co., 33 Hun.
(N. Y.), 351. The majority of the decisions lay down the same rule as
in the principal case that misstatement of the age of the child, by the child
or his parents, does not affect the liability of his employer. Beghold v.
Auto Body Co., 149 Mich., 14; Norman v. Virginia-Pocahontas Coal Co.,
69 S. E., 857 (W. Va.) ; Glucina v. F. H. Goss Brick Co., 115 Pac., 843
(Wash.). The New York Courts, on the other hand, hold that an em-
ployer is not guilty of negligence per se for injury to a child employed
contrary to the statute unless the employer knew that the child wag under
the probited age, or unless his appearance was such as to put him upon
inquiry with respect thereto; Stenson v. Flick Construction Co., 146 App.
Div., 66; so that if the plaintiff falsely stated his age and the defendant
-was justified in believing him, the employment of the child would not be
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negligence per se. Koester v. Rochester Candy Works, 194 N. Y., 92. The
ruling of the principal case, affirming the weight of authority is the better
rule. The object of'the statutes is to -prevent the employment of child
labor in certain occupations. The only effective way to prevent such em-
ployment is to enforce the statute strictly against the master. To follow
the New York rule would be, as is said in Beauchamp v. Sturges & Burn
Co., 250 II1., 303, to hold that a child by false statements as to his age,
could, in effect, repeal the statute. The desire of a child to obtain em-
'ployment should not be permitted to overrule a statute passed with the
view of bettering the conditions of society. An analogy to this decision
is found in the rule that one selling liquor to a minor contrary to a statute,
is not excused because the minor misrepresented himself as of age. State
-v. Thompson, 74 Iowa, 119; State v. Bruder, 35 Mo. App., 475; In re Carl-
.son's License, 127 Pa., 330.
PAYMENT-MISTAXE OF LAW OR FAcT-RIGHT To RECOVER.-PoLITIES V.
BARLIN, 149 S. W. (Ky.), 828.-Plaintiff was employed in defendant's shce
shining parlor from the age of fifteen to twenty-one years and was given
"tips" by customers, which he put in the cash register, believing that his
employer required him to do so, and that he had no right to the money.
The plaintiff now sues for the money and is allowed to -recover, regardless
of whether the mistake which induced the payment was one of law or fact.
The prevailing rule is that money paid voluntarily with knowledge of
facts but under a mistake of law cannot be recovered. DeBow v. Upiited
States, 29 Ct. CI., 115; Powell v. Bunger, 79 Ind., 468; Beard v. Beard, 25
W. V., 486; County of Jefferson v. Hawkins, 23 Fla., 223; Heath & Mil-
ligan Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Linseed Oil Co., 99 Ill. App., 90; Inhabitants of
East Sudbury v. Sudbury, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.), 1; Strafford Say. Bank v.
Church, 69 N. H., 582. The rule applies in equity as well as in law, if
there is nothing unconscientious in retaining it. Hemphill v. Moody, 64
Ala., 468; Tiffany v. Johnson, 27 Miss.,,227. Where money is paid by
mistake of law, though with full knowledge of the facts, it may be recov-
ered, when the payee cannot in good conscience retain it. Culbreath v.
Culbreath, 7 Ga., 64; Kane v. Morehouse, 46 Conn., 300. In Kentucky,
money paid through "a clear and palpable mistake of law" essentially af-
fecting the rights of the parties, may be recovered. City of Louisville v.
Henning, 64 Ky., 381. But a payment of a debt barred by the statute of
limitations cannot be recovered on a plea of mistake of law. Hubbard v.
City of Hickman, 67 Ky., 204. In Missouri, money paid by mistake of
law may be recovered when it appears that the sum paid was not equitably
due. Foster v. Kirby, 31 Mo., 496. ' No authority was found holding con-
trary to the general rule that money paid by mistake of fact may be recov-
ered. The rule, however, has been modified to the extent that where the
payor has been negligent, money may not be recovered as against persons
who have.changed their positions in good faith, believing the payment to
have been rightly made. Walker v. Conant, 65 Mich., 194; Behring v.
Somerville, 63 N. J. Law, 568. The holding in the principal case is in
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harmony with the Kentucky decisions and, if the money was paid by mis-
take of fact, it is unquestionably correct; but the doctrine announced that
money paid by mistake of law can be recovered is contrary to the great
weight of authority.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-PART PERFORMANCE-PERSONAL SERVICES.-FRED.
ET AL. V. ASBURY ET AL., 152 S. W., 155.-Held, that personal services of a
character not easily admitting of pecuniary compensation rendered under
an oral contract as the consideration for land, may be a sufficient act of
part performance to take the contract out of the Statute of Frauds,
The doctrine of part performance is recognized only in Courts of Equity,
and not in Courts of Law. Chicago Attach. Co. v. Davis Sewing Machine-
Co., 142 Ill., 171. In a few jurisdictions, even in equity, this principle is
not accepted. Patton v. McLure, Mart. & Y., 333; Goodloe v. Goodloe,
116 Tgnn., 252; Paterson U. Yeaton, 47 Me., 308. While the general doc-
trine is well established, the difficulty is to say what acts will be sufficient
part performance to take the case out of the statute. Cramer v. Mooney,
59 N. J. Eq., 164. Nothing is to be considered a part performance which
does not put the party performing in a situation which will be a fraud on
him unless the agreement is performed. Jones v. Patrick, 140 Fed., 403-
Nor can the plaintiff rely on any part performance done by the defendant.
Luckett -t. Williamson, 37 Mo., 388. In case of parol contracts for the
sale or conveyance of land, going into possession under the contract and
making improvements is sufficient; Logue v. Langan, 151 Fed., 455; White
v. White, 231 Ill., 298; Harrell v. Lonnabend, 191 Mass., 310; but the im-
provements must be permanent in character. Baker v. Allison, 186 Ill., 613.
In New York possession under the contract is enough. Dunckel v. Dunckel,
141 N. Y., 427. Such possession must be notorious, exclusive, continuous
and in pursuance of the contract. Baldwin v. Baldwin, 73 Kan., 39. Some
cases hold that the payment of a considerable part of the purchase price is.
enough. Main v. Twelbourn, 4 Ves., 720. But the weight of authority is
that the mere payment of even all the purchase money is not enough;
Koenig v. Dohm, 209 Ill., 468; Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass., 21; Shipman v.
Shipman, 65 N. J. Eq., 556; unless the vendee cannot be restored to his
original position by repayment. Gerber v. Upton, 123 Mich., 605. This is.
because the payment of money can be ascribed to many other causes than
the contract, and the legal remedy is generally adequate. Andrew v. Bab-
cock, 63 Conn., 109. But payment of the purchase price and possession
taken under the contract is enough. Hill v. Den., 121 Cal., 42. The
making of a will in pursuance of a parol contract is also sufficient. Tur-
nipseed v. Sirrine, 57 S. C., 559. The rendering of services of a personal
or peculiar nature under a parol contract is sufficient; Pike v. Pike, 121
Mich., 170; Lynn v. Hockaday, 162 Mo., 111; White v. Poole, 74 N. H., 71;
but they must not be capable of being measured by pecuniary standards.
Rhodes v. Rhodes, 3 Sand. Ch., 279. If their value can be found with
reasonable accuracy, and the plaintiff put in statn quo by the recovery of
damages, specific performance will not be granted. Cooper v. Colson, 66
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N. J. Eq., 328; Russell v. Brig'rs, 165 N. Y., 500; Den v. Ackerman, 182
Pa. St., 591. But where it is evident from thd agreement that the parties
themselves did not intend to measure the services by Any pecuniary stand-
ard, as in the principal case, and legal damages will not compensate for
the work done, it seems that equity, to prevent the perpetration of fraud
-ought to decree specific performance, especially when, as here, the whole
course of life or life work of the plaintiff has been changed in carrying
out his end of the bargain.
WATER COMPANIES-CONTRACTS FOR FIRE PROTECTiON-BREACH-AcTION
-y TAXPAYER.-GERMAN ALLIANCE INSURANCE Co. V. HOME WATER SUPPLY
Co., 33 Sup. CT., 32.-Held, that a contract by a city with a water com-
pany for a water supply will not sustain an action against the water com-
pany for a breach of its contractual obligations to furnish water for fire
protection, brought by a taxpayer whose property was destroyed by fire
:s the result of such breach, the contract not appearing to have been made
for the benefit of taxpayers.
In twenty-four jurisdictions in the United States, and in England, the
-doctrine of the principal case is upheld, but the Courts of Florida, Ken-
tucky, and North Carolina have persistently maintained one directly con-
trary. Various reasons are given in support of the majority view. In
-some decisions, it is said that the city had no power to make a contract for
the benefit of its citizens, Mott v. Water Co., 48 Kan., 12; but it is the
general rule that a municipal corporation has the power, unless restricted
'by statute or charter, to enter into any contract and incur any debt neces-
sary to enable it to carry out the particular powers expressly or impliedly
-conferred upon it. Webb City & Carterville W. Co. v. Webb City, 78 Mo.
App., 422; E. St. Louis v. Gas Co., 98 Ill., 415. And so it has the power to
-enter into contracts with private individuals or corporations for supplyinj
water for the municipality and its inhabitants. Webb City & C. v. Webb
City, supra; Ancrum v. Camden W. Co., 82 S. C., 284. Other decisions
'hold that there is no privity of contract between the water company and
the taxpayer; Lovejoy v. Bessemer W. Co., 146 Ala., 374; still others hold
-that the contract was not made for the benefit of the taxpayer, and, in one
instance, notwithstanding a specific provision therein to the contrary. Mott
-v. Water Co., supra. But the greater number of decisions are based on
the doctririe that a beneficiary cannot sue unless he is one to whom the
Ipromisee owes some legal or equitable duty. Mott v. Water Co., supra;
Howsmon v. Trenton W. Co., 119 Mo., 304. Privity therein is not gener-
ally requisite for maintaining an action for breach of a contract, for in
twenty-five States, including Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri,
Nebraska, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, and Wisconsin, where the
doctrine of the principle case is consistently followed, a sole or donee
'beneficiary of a contract is allowed to maintain an action for breach there-
of. Wald's Pollock on Contracts, Williston's 3d Ed., p. 249. Followed
to its logical conclusion the doctrine of the majority makes the breach of
:a contract of this nature damnum absque injiutia, for the city has no pe-
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cuniary interest in such a contract; Wald's Pollock on Contracts, Willis-
ton's 3d Ed., p. 254; and, it has been held, cannot itself recover thereon,
even for the loss of its own property. Milford v. Bangor R. & E. Co.,
106 Me., 316; Town v. Ukiah W. & Imp. Co., 142 Cal., 173. On the other
hand, the minority holding stands on the ground that the taxpayer, as
beneficiary, is the real party in interest, and as such has a right of action
for breach of the contract; Woodbury v. Tampa W. Co., 57 Fla., 243;
and it seems to do justice and to be consistent with sound legal principles.
However, the decision in the principal case is correct in law, if it is right
as to the fact that the contract was not made for the benefit of taxpayers;
and it will undoubtedly remain the rule in the great majority of jurisdic-
,tions. For a comprehensive discussion of this subject see YALE LAW
JOURNAL, vol. 19, p. 428.
WILLS-TRuST ESTATE-"INCOME'!--CORPORATE STOcK DIVIDEND.-IN RE
OSBORNE, 138 N. Y. Su'p., 18.-Held, that under a testamentary gift of the.
residuary estate, consisting of corporate stock, of testator in trust, to pay
the income to a beneficiary for life, with gift over of the estate on her
death, a stock dividend representing accumulated profits, earned in part
during testator's lifetime and in part after his death, goes to the life tenant
as "income" which is gain or profit, and which proceeds from labor, busi-
ness, property, or capital.
Dividends, cash or stock, earned before the life tenancy began, are
regarded as part of the corpus, and as such go to the remainderman. Van
Doren v. Olden, 19 N. J. Eq., 176. If the dividends are accumulated after
or during the tenancy they are looked on as income and go to the life
tenant. Appeal of Phila. Trust, Safe Deposit & Ins. Co., 16 Atl., 734.
There are different rules when part of the dividends are earned before
and part after such tenancy began. The early English rule gave ordi-
nary dividends, declared during life tenancy to the tenant, but extraordi-
nary or unusual dividends were held to belong to the remainderman. Irving
v. Houston, 4 Paton., 521. (Found in Vol. II, Scots Reports, p. 164.) The
Massachusetts rule, to which the later English rule corresponds, gives all
cash dividends, however large, to the life tenant and all stock dividends,
however made, to the remainderman. Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass., 108;
Lyman v. Pratt, 183 Mass., 58; Bouch v. Spoule, L. R. 12 App. Cas., 385.
This rule was followed by the United States Supreme Court in Gibbons v.
Mahon, 136 U. S., 549, and by Connecticut in Bishop v. Bishop, 81 Conn.,
509. The Pennsylvania rule, also known as. the American rule, gives the
entire dividend, stock or cash, to the life tenant, if earned during his ten-
ancy, Smiths' Estate, 140 Penn., 344; but if the devidend is earned or ac-
cumulated before the tenancy began, it goes to the remainderman. Oliver's
Estate, 136 Penn., 43. If it is earned partly before and partly after the
beginning of the life tenancy, a just apportionment between the two is at-
tempted. Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. St., 368. In what is known as the
New York and Kentucky rule, the Courts determine for themselves, ac-
cording to the nature and substance of the thfing which the corporation
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has assumed to transfer, whether a dividend, when declared, represents
earnings or not. Lowry v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Bank, 172 N. Y., 137.
If the dividends are from earnings, they go to the life tenant, McLouth v.
Hunt, 154 N. Y., 179; if they are not a distribution of profits, they belong
to the corpus. In re Kernochan, 104 N. Y., 618. Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky., 257,
is to the same effect. The New York Courts refuse to apply the principle
of apportionment, resembling Massachusetts in this respect. In the prin-
cipal case, therefore, the Court was but following its general rule. It is
evident that the Pennsylvania rule, if it can be carried out, will bring about
more equitable results than any of the others. The Massachusetts rule
seems to be favored because of its simplicity and convenience, and betcause
it is more strictly logical and practical than the others.
WITNESSES-SELF-CRMINATION-PRDUCTION OF CORPORATE BooKs.-
GRANT V. UNITED STATES, 33 Sup. CT., 190.-Held, that a stockholder in a
defunct corporation cannot invoke his constitutional privilege against self-
crimination to justify his refusal to produce before the grand jury, under
a subpoena duces tecun, the corporate books and papers in his possession,
although the legal title to such books and papers may be in him.
Although the principal case may appear to be in conflict with the privi-
lege against self-crimination provided for in the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, and although cases involving similar facts have
held that an officer of a corporation may refuse to produce the books of
the corporation on the ground that they will incriminate him, Ex parte
Chapman, 153 Fed., 371 (Idaho) ; In re Hale, 139 Fed., 496 (N. Y.) ; yet
the principal case, which affirms the decisions laid down in Wheeler v.
United States, 33 Sup. "Ct., 158, and in Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S.,
361, states the better rule. For, although it is well settled law that the
privilege against self-crimination protects a man against the compulsory
production of his private books and papers, Boyd v. United States, 116
U. S,. 616; Ballman v. Fagin, 200 U. S., 195; it is equally well established
that in governmental proceedings the privilege of self-crimination is not
available in respect to books required by law to be kept in order that there
may be suitable information of transactions which are the appropriate sub-
jects of governmental regulation, since such books are public documents,
not kept for private uses, but for the benefit of the public and for public
inspection. State v. Farnun, 73 S. C., 165; State v. Donovan, 10 N. D.,
203; State v. Davis, 108 Mo., 666. Corporate books are to be considered
in this class, since the corporation having been granted a charter by the
State to make use of certain franchises, the State therefore has the right
to demand the production of the -books and papers of the corporation to
inquire how these franchises have been employed. Wilson v. United States,
supra. Furthermore, though the corporation be dissolved, its books and
papers are still impressed with the incidents attending corporate docu-
ments. Wilson v. United States, supra. It would be clearly against public
policy to allow an officer of a corporation to prevent inspection into the
affairs of the corporation, on the ground that the records would supply
evidence of his criminal dereliction.
